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Abstract 
This study complements the inclusive growth literature by examining the determinants and 
consequences of the middle class in a continent where economic growth has been relatively 
high. The empirical evidence is based on a sample of 33 African countries for a 2010 cross-
sectional study. OLS, 2SLS, 3SLS and SUR estimation techniques are employed to regress a 
plethora of middle class indicators, notably, the: floating, middle-class with floating, middle-
class without floating, lower-middle-income and upper-middle-income categories. Results can 
be classified into two main strands. First, results on determinants broadly show that GDP per 
capita and education positively affect all middle class dependent variables. However, we have 
seen a negative nexus for the effect of ethnic fragmentation, political stability in general and 
partially for economic vulnerability. Simple positive correlations have been observed for: the 
size of the informal sector, openness and democracy. Second, on the consequences, the 
middle class enables the accumulation of human and infrastructural capital, while its effect is 
null on political stability and democracy in the short-run but positive for governance and 
modernisation. Policy implications are discussed.  
Keywords: Poverty; Inequality; Middle class; Africa 
JEL Codes: D31; O1, O4, O55, I32,  
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1. Introduction 
 ‘Output may be growing, and yet the mass of the people may be becoming poorer’ (Lewis, 
1955). Piketty (2014) has recently joint the stream of authors and shown in his ‘capital in the 
21
st
 century’ that the Kuznets (1955, 1971) conjectures are invalid in developed economies.  
Africa’s burgeoning growth relative to the rest of the world has been accompanied with 
concerns of ‘immiserizing growth’1.  A lot has been documented on the need for inclusive 
development and the imperative of understanding inequality in the poverty-growth nexus 
(Kalwij & Verschoor, 2007;  Thorbecke, 2013). The narratives have included: the 
employment of instruments associated with growth elasticity (Adam, 2004), the relevance of 
inequality in the fight against poverty (Datt & Ravallion, 1992; Kakwani, 1993; Ali & 
Thorbecke, 2000; Elu, 2013; Mthuli et al., 2014) and the role of income distribution in the 
effect of growth on poverty (Ravallion, 1997; Easterly, 2000; Fosu, 2014).  
 The above narratives have been substantiated in both developing countries (Fosu, 
2010a) and samples of African (Fosu, 2008, 2009, 2010b, 2010c) economies. The works are 
broadly consistent with Lewis (1955) on the need for growth to be inclusive. On more specific 
notes:  “The responsiveness of poverty to income is a decreasing function of inequality, and 
the inequality elasticity of poverty is actually larger than the income elasticity of poverty” 
(Fosu, 2010a, p. 1432); “In general, high initial levels of inequality limit the effectiveness of 
growth in reducing poverty while growing inequality increases poverty directly for a given 
level of growth” (Fosu, 2011, p. 11) and;  “The study finds that the responsiveness of poverty 
to income is a decreasing function of inequality” (Fosu, 2010c, p. 818). These conclusions 
support an evolving stream of literature on inclusive development and success in post-2015 
goals
2
.  
  In light of the above, numerous proposals on development models have been 
documented recently. Among them, is the Moyo conjecture that is essentially based on an 
evolving middle-class. According to Moyo (2013), the middle class is necessary to implement 
the Washington consensus (WC) which she defines as ‘private capitalism, liberal democracy 
                                                             
1
 First put forward by Bhagwati (1958), the concept is one that summarises a situation in which economic growth 
is accompanied by negative externalities.  
2
 See, inter alia: Ozgur et al. (2009),  Timmons et al. (2009), Bagnara (2012), Monika & Bobbin (2012),  Miller 
(2014) & Singh (2014).  
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and priority in political rights’. According to the author, such a middle class can be easily 
achieved with the Beijing Model (BM), which is defined as ‘state capitalism, deemphasised 
democracy and priority in economic rights’. Hence, while the WC is a model of the long-run, 
the BM is more appropriate in the short-term to deliver a middle class that would sustainably 
demand political rights. The intuition behind the conjecture is that, a sustainable middle class 
is needed to demand political rights in a sustainable manner (Asongu, 2014a; Asongu & 
Aminkeng, 2014). There is a growing body of literature documenting the Moyo conjecture 
(Asongu, 2014a; Asongu & Aminkeng, 2014). It should also be noted that this conjecture has 
already been partially verified in developing (Lalountas et al., 2011) and African (Asongu, 
2014b) countries.  
 But why is the focus on Africa particularly important? In accordance with recent 
narratives, while overall  growth experienced between 1990-2010 has moved hand-in-glove 
with growing inequality and poverty, some recent works demonstrate that Africa has done 
relatively better (Young, 2012), especially in reducing inequality (Fosu, 2014) and is on time 
in Millennium Development poverty reduction targets (Pinkivskiy &  Sala-i-Martin, 2014). In 
line with Asongu (2014c), whereas South Asian and Latin American countries experienced 
slow and considerable inequality reduction between 1980-2010, the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation & Development (OECD), South East Asian and the Middle East & 
North Africa (MENA) nations have witnessed rising inequality during the same lapse of time. 
Hence, Africa is a good candidate on which to investigate determinants and consequences of 
the middle class.  
Graph 1 below illustrates the evolving relationship between of the middle class and 
income inequalities in Africa. This graph provided by Ncube & Shimeles (2013) from 
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) micro-data shows that inequality has been rising in 
the past few years. This recent tendency could be translated by many as the fruits of economic 
prosperity not trickling down to the poor segments of the population. Conversely, there has 
been a consistent growth in middle-class income since the year 2000. According to the 
narrative, most countries that have experienced a substantial growth in the middle-income 
class have also witnessed burgeoning economic growth in the same periods.  
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Graph 1: Evolution of Middle class and Inequality  
 
Source : Ncube &  Shimeles (2013) 
 
In 2010, the middle class had increased to 34% of the African population -representing 
about 350 million inhabitants. The statistics stand at 27% or 126 million in 1980; 27% in 
1990 and; 27% or 220 million in the year 2000. This represents an increasing rate in the 
middle class population of 3.1% between 1980 and 2010. Within this span, the population of 
the continent increased by 2.6%.  Results from the International Comparison Program (ICP) 
for the year 2005 show that per capita expenditure among the middle class in Africa increased 
about twofold relative to increases witnessed in other regional economies of developed 
countries. Annual consumer spending in Africa, principally from the middle class was 
estimated at $680 billion in 2008. This amount represents about a quarter of African GDP 
assuming Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) with base year 2008.  
Consistent with various studies that have emphasised the importance of the middle 
class, the above variations are expected to wheel changes in Africa from various angles. For 
example Adelman & Morris (1997) and Landes (1998) have provided a historic proof to 
substantiate that, up till the 19
th
 century the middle was a major driving force in the 
development of Europe and North America. Recent discussions have also underlined the 
important role of the middle class in, inter alia: social progress (Sridharan, 2004), institutional 
reforms (Loyza et al., 2012), democratic promotion (Petterson, 2007), inclusive development 
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(Birdsall, 2010), fight against poverty (Dyan, 1997) and innovation & entrepreneurship 
(Banerjee & Duflo, 2009).  
 The purpose of this empirical study is to understand the socioeconomic determinants 
and consequences of the middle class in Africa. This assessment is important in the 
perspective that it enriches the literature on middle class determinants as well as its 
characteristics or consequences. The second interest of this study is the employment of 
original middle class indicators, ad hoc measurements put forward by the African 
Development Bank (AfDB).  
 The rest of the study is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the data while the 
empirical results are presented in Section 3. We conclude with Section 4.  
 
2. Data 
2.1 Data description 
2.1.1 Middle class 
 Generally, the middle class could be understood either in absolute or in relative terms. 
First, in absolute terms, Bhalla (2009) attributes an annual income of 3900 USD in PPP to the 
attainment of a middle class. A different view is provided by Banerjee & Duflo (2008). 
According to them, per capita daily expenditure of in-between 6 and 10 USD attributes a 
middle-class status. While Ravallion (2009) and Wheary (2009) have proposed between 2-3 
USD per/day, Kohut (2009)  an average expenditure of 10 USD, Kharas (2010) has gone 
much further in proposing a daily expenditure scale of 10 to 100 USD. Second, in relative 
terms, the middle class can be defined as any household that is situated between 20 and 80e 
percentile of the consumption distribution (Easterly, 2001) or between 0.75 and 1.25 times the 
median revenue of the inhabitant in the zone under consideration (Birdsall et al., 2000).  
 Since estimations for Africa are not very apparent, we use those proposed by Ncube et 
al. (2011) from the AfDB. They have considered per capita daily consumption of between 2 
to 10 USD in 2005 PPP. Hence, they have been more methodical in establishing three sub-
categories.   
The first category is the Floating class (FC) with a daily per capita expenditure in the 
threshold of between 2 to 4 USD. Its floating character is derived from the fact that it is in-
between the poor class and the lower-middle class. Hence, we infer that it is vulnerable and 
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unstable. However, according to the authors this category has the advantage of reflecting 
changes in population structure over time. This justification is consistent with López-Calva & 
Ortiz-Juarez (2011) who have concluded that inflows into and outflows from the middle class 
are frequent. In accordance with the AfDB (Ncube & Shimeles, 2013), about 60% of the 
African middle class (representing about 180 million inhabitants) are still within this 
category. This fraction can easily slide into the poverty class because of negative economic 
shocks. The second sub-category qualified as Lower-middle-class has per capita daily 
expenditure fluctuating between 4 and 10 USD. This entails households that are in the 
economy of substance and hence could consume non-essential goods. The third sub-category 
is the Upper-middle-class (UC) with an estimated per capita daily expenditure of between 10 
and 20 USD. In addition to the discussed three sub-categories, we add two more for 
robustness purposes, notably: (1) a middle-class without the floating class (MCWFC) and; (2) 
a middle-class with the floating class (MCWtFC). 
The study has made use of the Beta approach in estimating different points on the 
Lorenz curve showing the proportion of the population and their corresponding portion of 
national income (Kakwani, 1980). The equality line represents the situation of perfect equality 
in a society. The extreme case is one where an individual monopolises all the wealth in the 
world while the rest of the world is left with no wealth. The Lorenz curve is fundamentally 
used to represent inequality in income distribution within a population. The distance from the 
equality line is proportional to the degree of inequality in a given society.  
Graph 2 : Lorenz  curve   
 
Source : Ncube et al. (2011) 
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 In order to determine the three unique values (4$, 10$ & 20$) susceptible of 
generating the Lorenz curve in Africa (Graph 2), the authors have proceeded in two steps.  
 In the first-step, the authors estimate the Gini coefficient from a hypothesis of linear 
tendency between two observations because data on inequality (e.g the Gini index) is scarce. 
Hence, the Gini coefficient which measures the level of inequality can be written in function 
of the Lorenz curve as follows:  
 
 
Where Si is the trapezium area under the Lorenz curve.  The Gini coefficient 
represents the proportion of the zone situated between the equality line & the Lorenz curve 
and the total surface above & below the Lorenz curve.  
 A system of equations is used in the second-step to estimate a number of points. In the 
equations presented below, for every African country and for every year, the system of 
equation enables the estimation of points F, H & J which respectively correspond to the daily 
per capita expenditure of 4$, 10$ & 20$, that constitute the Gini coefficient. These three 
values represent the proportions of the population associated with daily per capita income. 
These represent the Floating class, Lower-middle-income and Upper-middle income 
respectively. This system enables us to identify the position of three points such that the 
desired first equation (Eq. (1)) is satisfied. The six equations below each represent an area in 
the form of a trapezium under the Lorenz curve for a series of coordinates. The system is 
presented as follows:  
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Where f(x) is the Lorenz curve. AC and AE represent the proportion of the population 
associated with the first and second poverty lines respectively. Similarly BC and DE denote 
parts of income associated to people whose income is below the first and second lines of 
poverty.  
After identifying the three points for each country in the sample, the results are aggregated at 
the African level using a double weighing approach: the proportion of population of the 
country in the whole sample and the part of revenue of the sampled country to total income. 
Values estimated for the  year 2010 have been calculated using tendencies on the bases the 
last-two values of the Gini coefficient corresponding to the household survey from PovCalNet 
of the World Bank which provides detailed income distributions or household spending on 
consumption in different percentiles based on real household survey data.  Moreover, 
PovCalNet provides information on average household, the level of per capita consumption or 
income in 2005 USD PPP.  
2.1.2 Determining factors  
 Many variables have been documented in the literature to potentially affect the middle 
class. However, we retain only some of these owing to data availability constraints. The 
retained variables are as follows.  
 Openness, population, agriculture and the level of development (lgdpcap) are obtained 
from World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank. While the population variable 
is in logarithm, openness is the sum of imports to exports as a percentage of GDP. Agriculture 
(agricultur) is measured by considering the added value of agriculture to GDP. The level of 
development is measured by the logarithm of GDP per capita. Ethnic fragmentation is 
obtained from Alesina et al. (2003). It measures the probability that two generic individuals 
are not individuals of the same ethnic group for every country. Legal origin (legor) proposed 
by La Porta et al. (1999) is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for English Common law 
countries and 0 otherwise.  Democracy (demo) is also a binary variable with 1 when the 
country is democratic and 0 otherwise. This classification is consistent with Cheibub et al. 
(2010). Education (duremoyenn) is approximated by the average number of schooling years, 
in line with Barro & Lee (2010). Political stability/no violence (Polstabsenv) are indicators of 
political stability obtained from the World Bank, compiled by Kaufman, Kraay & Mastruzzy. 
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Economic vulnerability (Vulnerabilit) is appreciated by the index proposed by Guillaumont 
(2008) and updated by Cariolle & Goujon (2013). The informal economy is estimated by a 
dynamic approach. This indicator which represents the weight of this sector on GDP is 
obtained from Schneider et al. (2010).   
2.1.3 Variables of consequence  
 Openness (open), agriculture, the level of development (lgdpcap) and urbanisation are 
obtained from WDI. While the first-three are the same as discussed above, urbanisation is 
measured by urban population as a proportion of total population. The measurements of Ethic 
fragmentation, legal origin, democracy, education, political stability/no violence and 
vulnerability are in accordance with the discussion in the previous section.  
 Other variables like governance, health, social protection, budget management and 
education indices are obtained from the Mo Ibrahim Foundation. These indices vary between 
0 and 100, in increasing order for the best results. These are composite indicators.  
For example, the health indicator is represented by the infant & maternal mortality rates, 
illness (malaria, cholera & tuberculosis), vaccines (DTP, Measles) and antiretroviral 
treatments. The social protection variable is based on: the social protection regime, 
employment policies and social protection, access to water and respect for the environment. 
The indicator measuring infrastructure is based on: access to electricity, highways, air and 
railway, telephone & information technology infrastructure and numerical coverage. The 
education indicator entails: the quality of education, the number of teachers in the primary 
school, primary school completion rate, transition to secondary school and registration at the 
tertiary level.  
 Economic diversification was measured by the diversification index proposed by the 
AfDB and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation & Development (OECD). This 
evaluation ranges from 0 to 100, with the higher values representing better results. This 
indicator which is based on some symmetry of the Herfindahl index from four-figure exports, 
appreciates the diversification of exports. The inflation variable is obtained from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and measures the annual consumer price inflation. The 
doingbusiness indicators from the World Bank are used to appreciate the ease of doing 
business.  
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2.1.4 Statistical Analysis  
 Table 1 below presents the descriptive statistics of the sampled countries. Based on the 
measures of central tendency, we notice the variables are quite comparable (means) and also 
vary significantly (standard deviations) for us to expect that reasonable estimations would 
emerge.  
Table 1. Summary Statistics  
Variables 
 
Obs Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
      
MCWtFC 44 12.34 9.96 1.9 45.6 
MCWFC 44 31.45 22.34 4.8 89.5 
FC 44 19.12 13.74 2.4 57.3 
LM 44 7.75 6.25 1.2 29 
UM 31 4.83 4.50 .7 20 
Informal 38 40.32 8.02 22.4 62 
 
Vulnerability 53 39.06 11.55 17.61 66.54 
Agriculture 40 22.07 14.41 2.47 57.30 
Duremoyenn 52 4.73 2.11 1.2 9.4 
 
Open  53 80.55 39.64 1.99 190.71 
Population 53 5.56 5.23 .37 30.74 
Lgdpcap 52 7.72 1.01 5.90 10.04 
Demo 50 .26 .44 0 1 
 
Polstabsenv 53 -.62 .90 -2.48 .89 
Elf 52 .61 .27 .03 .92 
legor_fr 53 .64 .48 0 1 
Infrastructure  53     31.38     19.00    .84    81.29 
Governance 53     50.45      13.79    7.86    82.46 
Economic diversification 53     9.30     11.724         1.1        59.60 
Social protection  53     52.32     16.29    3.57    88.68 
Education  53     50.71     19.45           0 95.85 
Health  53     65.55     17.45    26.67    99.38 
Budget management 52     60.82     21.41           0         100 
Inflation  52     6.267    6.15     -2.41        34.7 
Urbanisation  53         39.50     17.17         9.60          86 
legor_uk 53     .36     .484           0           1 
Ease of doing business  51     136.82     42.99          24         185 
FC: Floating Class. MCWtFC: Middle class with Floating Class (FC). MCWFC: Middle class without FC. LM: Lower 
middle income. UM: Upper middle income. Informal: Informal economy.  Duremoyen: Average schooling years. Open: 
Openness. Lgdpcap: economic development. Demo: Democracy. Polstabsenv: Political stability/no voilence. Elf: Ethnic 
fractionalisation. Legor_fr: French civil law. Legor_uk: English common law. Obs: Observations. Min: Minimum. Max: 
Maximum.  
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3. Empirical results  
3.1 Middle class determinants  
 The basic results are presented in Table 2 below are based on Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS). Estimations in the first-two columns are based on the Middle class without the 
Floating class (MCWtFC). While regressions in the first column are not corrected for 
heterosedasticity, those in the second column are corrected for the problem, detected with the 
Breusch-Pagan test. Hence, only results of the second column are taken into account. From a 
general perspective, though the nexus is not significant, we notice the positive relationship 
between the dependent variable and the size of the informal sector. Economic vulnerability 
has a negative effect on MCWtFC. The sign of this effect is logical since vulnerable 
economies offer fewer opportunities for the growth of this class. Accordingly, such 
economies are easily affected by exogenous and endogenous shocks. Moreover, what is 
interesting in this from a theoretical viewpoint is the fact that this variable does not 
fundamentally alter results of the economic growth indicator. This contravenes the notion that 
less wealthy economies are more vulnerable. Accordingly, its rare employment in past studies 
represents a variable omission bias.  
 Political stability and ethnic fragmentation also fall in the category of estimated 
coefficients with a negative relationship with the dependent variable. As concerns the former, 
no major comment is worthwhile because it is not consistently significant across 
specifications. This is not the case of the latter for which, with a 95% confidence level, ethnic 
fragmentation is the highest estimated coefficient in terms of magnitude. This result is 
consistent with a plethora of studies, notably: Ncube & Shimeles (2013) for African data, 
Easterly (2001) for cross-sectional data and the Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2010) for 
Asia.  
 The sign of the agricultural variable is positive, albeit insignificant. The same 
conclusion can be drawn of the following coefficients: openness, population and French civil 
law countries. The insignificance of openness is consistent with Chun et al. (2011) and the 
ADB (2010). These past studies considered the population factor for various reasons. For 
instance Banerjee & Duflo (2008) have noticed that the Middle class tends to have fewer 
children. Consistent with Murphy et al. (2011), its incorporation enables us to measure the 
size of the internal market. Accordingly, Yuan et al. (2011) have found that industrialisation 
and market development have substantially contributed to the development of the middle 
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class in China. Like in Chun et al. (2011), we have not been able to confirm the Yuan et al. 
(2011) conclusion.  
 It is also important to underline that the effect of English common law has not been 
incorporated to mitigate issues of multicollinearity. It is surprising to notice that the sign 
associated to French civil law is positive. This is because the studies of La Porta et al. (1998, 
1999, 2008) provide English common law countries with an edge in development. This sign is 
also inconsistent with the estimation of Chun et al. (2011) and recent African studies (Agbor, 
2011; Asongu, 2012ab). This contradiction cannot be over emphasised because the sign of the 
estimated coefficient in the comparative study is not statistically significant.  
 Education, democracy and development (proxied with per capita GDP) have the 
expected positive signs.  Substantial human capital is necessary to belong to the middle class. 
This is consistent with Bledstein (1978) who has confirmed the intuition from the American 
experience. Moreover, these estimations appear to sustain the positive role of democracy on 
the constitution and evolution of the middle class. The positive relationship between these two 
variables is explained from the potential advantages that a democratic system offers. The 
nexus between the middle class and level of development had earlier been strongly 
established by Easterly (2001). A substantial body of the literature following Easterly’s work 
has confirmed the direction of this relationship.  Our results are consistent with the 
mainstream narrative. Accordingly, a one standard deviation increase of the underlying 
variable leads to a rise in the dependent variable by 10.9.  
Findings of the third and fourth columns (on MCWFC) are consistent with the first-
two. Like in the former narrative, only the fourth is of econometric relevance to us because it 
corrects the problem of heteroscedasiticity observed in the third column. Significant results 
from the third column are in line with those of MCWtFC. Meanwhile, we notice that all 
coefficients corresponding to significant variables have almost doubled. This change justifies 
our use of alternative dependent variables.  
 Columns 5 and 6 are concerned with effects on the floating class (FC). Hence, we can 
confirm that this social category has is significant in influencing how a number of our 
independent variables behave towards them. Here, we notice two fundamental changes: 
democracy is no longer significant while openness benefits this class. The positive role of 
openness on FC is in accordance with the findings of Dollar & Kraay (2004). In effect, it 
should not be forgotten that this social class is closest to the poor. The insignificance of 
democracy is surprising. 
14 
 
 As we proceed to columns 7-10, the results present a different configuration. Column 
8 on the Lower-middle income (LM) has findings that are consistent with those of the second 
column, with the exception of two aspects. First, the education variable no longer 
significantly affects the dependent variable. Second, political stability negatively affects this 
sub-category of the middle class. While the finding is consistent with the ADB (2010), it is 
surprising to notice that this variable is only significant for LM.  
 For the last-two columns on Upper-middle class (UM), the following could be 
established relative to the first-two columns. The insignificant effect of the informal sector on 
the middle class is no longer significant in the UM. Here the nexus is positively significant. 
This finding is inconsistent with the negative effect reported by Rossi et al. (2011).  The 
African informal sector appears to offer more opportunities than the formal sector in the 
perspective that it is easier to progress in the latter. This is justified by the ease of doing 
business while avoiding taxes (Johnson et al., 1998). However, it is quite interesting to notice 
that the positive effect only appears in the UM. Economic vulnerability no longer has a 
significant effect on this variable. This is logical because as income increases one is less 
associated with negative economic shocks. The same logic could be extended to the 
insignificant effects of political stability and democracy.  
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Table 2 : Basic results  
 MCWtFC MCWtFC MCWFC MCWFC FC FC LM LM UM UM 
Informal .290    
(0.090) 
.2989778 
(0.115) 
.1014277    
(0.752) 
.1014277   
(0.774) 
-.1971828 
(0.452) 
-.1971828   
(0.460) 
.1548194   
(0.194) 
.1548194   
(0.248) 
.1403694 
(0.176) 
.1403694 
(0.097) 
Vulnerabilit -.240   
(0.080) 
-.2397717   
(0.049) 
-.6191081   
(0.020) 
-.6191081   
(0.007) 
-.3798097   
(0.071) 
-.3798097   
(0.041) 
-.1969287   
(0.039) 
-.1969287   
(0.043) 
-.0405845 
(0.606) 
-.0405845 
(0.606) 
Agricultur .238  
(0.124) 
.2375271 
(0.100) 
.2801813   
(0.327) 
.2801813   
(0.149) 
.0400855 
(0.861) 
.0400855 
(0.747) 
.1207865 
(0.248) 
.1207865 
(0.170) 
.1193753 
(0.190) 
.1193753 
(0.107) 
Duremoyenn 2.029806    
(0.028) 
2.029806   
(0.021) 
2.409729   
(0.152) 
2.409729   
(0.125) 
.3659509   
(0.784) 
.3659509   
(0.772) 
1.059917 
(0.087) 
1.059917 
(0.113) 
.9760631 
(0.070) 
.9760631 
(0.094) 
Open  .0143355  
(0.687) 
.0143355 
(0.697) 
.1238221   
(0.074) 
.1238221   
(0.070) 
.1094302   
(0.054) 
.1094302   
(0.031) 
.0198541   
(0.417) 
.0198541   
(0.342) 
-.0053494    
(0.800) 
-.0053494 
(0.793) 
Population .0070668     
(0.980) 
.0070668    
(0.973) 
.1269818   
(0.814) 
.1269818   
(0.772) 
.120617 
(0.783) 
.120617 
(0.740) 
.0805272   
(0.682) 
.0805272   
(0.536) 
-.0714455 
(0.675) 
-.0714455 
(0.592) 
lgdpcap2005 10.79783 
(0.000) 
10.79783 
(0.000) 
19.98226   
(0.000) 
19.98226   
(0.000) 
9.156926 
(0.022) 
9.156926 
(0.002) 
6.415557    
(0.001) 
6.415557    
(0.000) 
4.393715 
(0.006) 
4.393715 
(0.000) 
Demo 2.785435    
(0.258) 
2.785435   
(0.093) 
5.970155 
(0.200) 
5.970155 
(0.079) 
3.168566 
(0.397) 
3.168566 
(0.254) 
3.132332   
(0.070) 
3.132332   
(0.026) 
-.3440317 
(0.812) 
-.3440317 
(0.762) 
Polstabsenv -1.828347   
(0.206) 
-1.828347   
(0.136) 
-3.255155 
(0.230) 
-3.255155 
(0.186) 
-1.411887 
(0.517) 
-1.411887 
(0.485) 
-1.789243 
(0.076) 
-1.789243 
(0.043) 
-.0406914 
(0.961) 
-.0406914   
(0.950) 
Elf -8.856901    
(0.040) 
-8.856901    
(0.041) 
-17.33965 
(0.033) 
-17.33965   
(0.022) 
-8.499412 
(0.183) 
-8.499412 
(0.162) 
-4.960058 
(0.087) 
-4.960058 
(0.095) 
-3.940712 
(0.116) 
-3.940712 
(0.046) 
legor_fr 3.215177  
(0.262) 
3.215177 
(0.239) 
5.398297 
(0.315) 
5.398297   
(0.290) 
-2.196867   
(0.612) 
-2.196867   
(0.555) 
1.76897 
(0.365) 
1.76897 
(0.366) 
1.444189 
(0.394) 
1.444189 
(0.194) 
Cons  -87.06037   
(0.005) 
-87.06037   
(0.004) 
-125.1175 
(0.026) 
-125.1175 
(0.012) 
-37.69897 
(0.383) 
-37.69897 
(0.219) 
-49.37451   
(0.017) 
-49.37451   
(0.014) 
-37.79953 
(0.032) 
-37.79953 
(0.008) 
Adjusted R²  0.7685  0.7685 0.8134 0.8134 0.6500 0.6500 0.7263 0.7263 0.5698 0.5698 
F de Fischer 10.66*** 10.38*** 13.68*** 23.74*** 6.40*** 8.53*** 8.72*** 11.14*** 4.85*** 5.85*** 
Breusch-Pagan test  0.0031  0.0139  0.0084  0.0042  0.0025  
Observations  33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 
Note :   All regressions have been corrected for heterescedasticity with in the White manner. P values in brackets. FC: Floating Class. MCWtFC : Middle class with Floating Class (FC). MCWFC: Middle 
class without FC. LM: Lower middle income. UM: Upper middle income. Informal: Informal economy.  Duremoyen: Average schooling years. Open: Openness. Lgdpcap: economic 
development. Demo: Democracy. Polstabsenv: Political stability/no voilence. Elf: Ethnic fractionalisation. Legor_fr : French civil law. Legor_uk: English common law.  
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 Table 3 presents instrumental variable findings based on Two-Stage Least Squares 
(TSLS) in order to tackle the issue of reverse causality. In effect, up till now, the findings 
have been based on correlations which are subject to simultaneity bias and circular relations. 
Hence, we have variables with a certain degree of significance in the preceding estimations 
which are susceptible of endogeneity bias for the regressions in the following table.  
 More precisely, Table 3 consists of five estimation blocks, notably for: GDP per 
capita, education, vulnerability, political stability and democracy. Each estimation uses the 
same variables as above. Those with some significance become the variables of interest.  In 
order to avoid integrating variables that are not of much relevance, we have only reported 
variables of interest
3
. The first block is focused on verifying the causality of GDP per capita. 
A plethora of studies in empirical literature have attempted to assess this concern, following 
the works of Easterly (2001). Accordingly, the problem is evident because while theoretically 
the level of development has an effect on the middle class, the opposite effect cannot be ruled-
out.  In essence, the literature has documented a relationship flowing from the size of the 
middle class to economic growth and poverty reduction (Ravallion, 2009).  
 In order to tackle this concern, GDP per capita has been instrumented with petroleum 
exports and tropical location. These two variables are borrowed from the literature. 
Accordingly, Bloom & Sachs (1998) and Sachs & Warner (1997) have shown that, 
enclavement and location in the tropics are serious impediments to development. Sachs & 
Warner (1995) have also been followed by an abundant literature documenting the 
inconvenient effects of natural resource abundance, notably petroleum (Frankel, 2012; Van 
der Ploeg, 2011).  
 The first instrument is a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if the country is a 
petroleum exporter and 0 otherwise.  While a dummy on commodity has been instead 
employed by Easterly (2001) for the first instrument, the second instrument is in accordance 
with him. It is also a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if the latitude of the country is 
higher than 23 and 0 otherwise. From a practical standpoint, the instruments are valid based 
on result from the Sargan and Hausman tests. Hence, we can confirm that the positive link 
from GDP per capita to the middle class is causal and not essentially exploratory. This 
positive nexus in Africa is consistent with Easterly (2001). We also notice that the importance 
of GDP per capita varies across social categories. Apparently, this importance is either of 
polynomial or quadratic form.  
                                                             
3
 Other variables can be provided upon request.  
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 The second block concerns education-related estimations. This variable is 
instrumented with historical IQ (Intellectual Quotient) and colonial types, notably: English 
Common law and French civil law countries. Historical IQ is the mean IQ of every country 
from Lynn (2012). This indicator has already been employed in many studies (Daniele, 2013; 
Kodila-Tedika & Cinyabuguma, 2014). Our hypothesis is a transgenerational type such that 
the accumulation of human capital depends on the past (t, tN-1). Hence, heritage of educational 
institutions of the present are influenced by intellectuals of the past. As concerns the other 
instrument, there are a plethora of studies that have established a significant difference in 
human capital when former colonies of English common law countries are distinguished from 
their French civil law counterparts (Cogneau, 2003, 2012; Cogneau & Moradi, 2013; 
Huillery, 2009). The Sargan overidentification restrictions (OIR) test confirms the validity of 
this instrument. Like for per capita GDP, the importance of education varies. Accordingly, it 
is more important for the FC but decreases for MCWtFC and further decreases for the UM.  
 In the third block on economic vulnerability, the same logic used in the choice of 
instruments for economic development applies. However, the results are different from those 
in Table 3. In fact, we notice that but for the nexus between the LM and vulnerability, the 
relationships were correlations. These findings are somewhat ambiguous because we expected 
the vulnerability to first affect the FC before affecting other categories of the middle class.  A 
possible explanation could be limited activities in the FC which gives the impression that this 
layer of the middle class becomes immune as vulnerability increases. In other words, channels 
via which vulnerability affects categories in the middle class differ.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
 
Table 3. Estimations with instrumental variables  
 
 
MCWtFC 
(VI) 
MCWFC 
(VI) 
FC 
(VI) 
LM 
(VI) 
UM 
(VI) 
lgdpcap2005 13.66756 
(0.005) 
25.93842 
(0.002) 
12.24949 
(0.060) 
9.415696 
(0.008) 
4.280107 
(0.069) 
Adj R² 0.7529 0.7982 0.6383 0.6835 0.5697 
F de Fischer 9.94 32.06 9.63 11.04 6.40 
Sargan N*R-sq test         0.6061 0.9807 0.7554 0.3574 0.7793 
Hausmann test               0.6869 0.9850 0.8081 0.4679 0.8271 
Observations  33 33 33 33 33 
Duremoyenn 4.096515 
(0.075) 
10.21961 
(0.029) 
6.11996 
(0.074) 
2.540851 
(0.058) 
1.571306 
(0.219) 
Adj R² 0.6927 0.6001 0.3261 0.6303 0.5235 
F de Fischer 6.91*** 18.92*** 9.60*** 8.15*** 4.88*** 
Sargan N*R-sq test         0.4140 0.4543 0.5278 0.7521 0.2969 
Hausmann test               0.5916 0.6270 0.6877 0.8495 0.4775 
Observations 32 32 32 32 32 
Vulnerabilit -.6876785 
(0.227) 
-1.373655 
(0.095) 
-.6877188 
(0.434) 
-.6944518 
(0.065) 
 
Adj R² 0.6393 0.7367 0.6235 0.3243  
F de Fischer 11.46*** 27.07*** 7.33*** 11.04***  
Sargan N*R-sq test         0.9943 0.7932 0.7077 0.9006  
Hausmann test               0.9956 0.8381 0.7699 0.9225  
Observations  33 33 33 33  
Polstabsenv -4.100428 
(0.051) 
-10.86753 
(0.022) 
-6.7665 
(0.076) 
-4.0788 
(0.017) 
-.0640 
(0.958) 
Adj R² 0.7350 0.7270 0.5262 0.6366 0.5911 
F de Fischer 7.25*** 19.81*** 8.11*** 7.37*** 8.18*** 
Sargan N*R-sq test         0.3288 0.0265 0.0152 0.4160 0.1053 
Hausmann test               0.5104 0.0713 0.0413 0.5934 0.3023 
Observations 32 32 32 32 32 
Demo 10.419 
(0.359) 
57.36622 
(0.332) 
46.87706 
(0.367) 
12.8238 
(0.304) 
-2.180655 
(0.774) 
Adj R² 0.6613 0.0880  0.2344 0.5427 
F de Fischer 0.7288*** 7.15*** 2.40** 3.00** 7.18*** 
Sargan N*R-sq test         0.2009 0.5809 0.7292 0.4173 0.5687 
Hausmann test               0.3666 0.7288 0.8342 0.5946 0.7196 
Observations 32 32 32 32 32 
Instruments Latitude, 
mécénat 
USA, 
mécenaturss, 
Etat neutre 
    
All regressions involve a constant and are corrected for heteroscedasticity in accordance with White. A constant is included in all 
specifications. P-values in brackets (). Lgdpcap2005: economic development. Duremoyenn: average schooling years. Vulnerabilit : economic 
vulnerability. Polstabsenv : Political stability. Demo : Democracy.   
 As concerns political stability, we have used latitudes and types of sponsorships or 
help from the superpowers during the Cold war. The ‘type of sponsorship’ has recently been 
documented as an instrument of institutions by Kodila-Tedika &Tcheta-Bampa (2014). These 
authors assert that the Cold war has influenced a certain institutional status quo. Accordingly, 
the specific context of the Cold war has enabled the persistence of colonial institutions for the 
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following reasons. By virtue of their power, the United States (US) was looking for external 
markets for its products and thus collaborated with past colonial powers which already had 
some experience in Africa. In return, European industries had to conserve most of their 
extractive industries. For the accord with the US to be effective, the US had to support non-
democratic elites in countries that experienced natural resource booms during the period of 
colonisation. The same logic applies for the former USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics). These supports have considerably diminished institutional constraints and politics 
on African presidents. These circumstances imply the African elite have been confronted with 
a fundamental arbitrage between weak and strong private property institutions. Hence, the 
leading elite of states that inherited these extractive institutions are more inclined to 
weakening property rights if rents from natural resources are substantial. This argument 
implies the Cold war and corresponding sponsorships by world powers of government elite in 
the wake of independence, have curtailed the development of private property institutions. 
Hence, the initial situations in which African states found themselves have been sustained 
over the years. Moreover, from a statistical viewpoint, these instruments are not quite useful 
for the UM, LM and MCWtFC sub-categories of the middle class. 
 Very surprisingly, after correction for potential biases in endogeneity, political 
stability appears to be significant for all the dependent variables, with the exception of UM. In 
other words, for a middle class to exist there is need for a certain political consensus to enable 
the emergence of such a class. This political stability guarantees the existence and survival of 
this class. This inference is correct given some recent studies by North et al. (2010) in which 
the dominant elite (or insiders) regulate violence in order to gain power which enables them 
to become wealthy while promoting the cooperation with different actors that can break the 
political equilibrium or stability of social order. As suggested in the estimations, at a certain 
level, the middle class can do without a political consensus. This threshold appears to be that 
of the UM, most probably because those belonging to the class must have protection 
mechanisms.  
 As concerns democracy, we exploit the same instruments as for political stability. 
These instruments are valid from a statistical viewpoint. Hence, one can consider democracy 
in Africa as major driver of the middle class.  
3.2 Consequences of the middle class  
 We borrow from Easterly (2001) in the procedure of estimating consequences of the 
middle class. We estimate the following system of equations:  
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Where, Y represents a set of variables to be explained. In the first equation, the endogenous 
components of the middle class are instrumented with legal origins (English common law and 
French civil law). X is the set of control variables. In order to avoid a cumbersome exercise, 
we only report coefficients corresponding to the middle class.  
3 .2.1 Infrastructure and human capital accumulation in the face of the middle class 
 Banerjee & Duflo (2008) have underlined that in many countries the middle class has 
the following characteristics, inter alia: consume expensive goods; are susceptible to live in 
more expensive houses and have pipe borne water, latrine & electricity in their houses. They 
are also very likely to substantially invest in human capital, to send their children to school 
and hence allocate a substantial portion of their wealth to the education of their children and 
good health service for their families. Kharas (2010) has emphasised on the important role of 
the world’s middle class in consumption.  On the other hand, Loayza et al. (2012) have linked 
the size of the middle class to more social policies.  
 From a broad perspective of accumulation, the effects are uniform. Accordingly, the 
size of the middle class positively affects our indicators of accumulation. We consistently 
notice a significant relationship at the 99% confidence level. Hence, an increasing middle 
class positively affects infrastructure, health, education and social protection. An interesting 
point worth noting is the magnitude of the coefficients. The effects appear to increase with 
categories in the middle-class. In essence, as the middle class level increases, its effect on the 
variables increases concurrently.  
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Table 4: Effect of the middle class on infrastructure and human capital  
 MCWtFC MCWFC FC LM UM Obs Method 
Infrastructure  .619372 
(0.000) 
1.560301 
(0.002) 
1.005685 
(0.001) 
2.609758 
(0.006) 
3.838819 
(0.001) 
41 3SLS 
 .4637494 
(0.000) 
.972417 
(0.000) 
.7326681 
(0.000) 
1.367563 
(0.000) 
2.359546 
(0.000) 
41 SUR 
Health .4585445 
(0.002) 
1.166653 
(0.003) 
.736214 
(0.004) 
1.95659 
(0.006) 
2.84097 
(0.005) 
41 3SLS 
 .3540659 
(0.000) 
.7889153 
(0.000) 
.5357255 
(0.000) 
1.192066 
(0.000) 
1.74705 
(0.000) 
41 SUR 
Education .4825966 
(0.001) 
1.236491 
(0.001) 
.7580215 
(0.006) 
2.059029 
(0.001) 
2.981836 
(0.003) 
41 3SLS 
 .4771552 
(0.000) 
1.143892 
(0.000) 
.6860127 
(0.000) 
1.816461 
(0.000) 
.4729788     
(0.000) 
41 SUR 
Social 
protection 
.4463489 
(0.002) 
1.142831 
(0.002) 
.7103854 
(0.005) 
1.909596 
(0.005) 
2.782222 
(0.005) 
41 3SLS 
 .3584981 
(0.000) 
.8240379 
(0.000) 
.5306968 
(0.000) 
1.255198 
(0.000) 
1.801687 
(0.000) 
41 SUR 
FC: Floating Class. MCWtFC: Middle class with Floating Class (FC). MCWFC: Middle class without FC. LM: Lower 
middle income. UM: Upper middle income. P-values in brackets.  3SLS: Three-Stage-Least Squares. SUR: Seemingly 
Unrelated Regressions. Obs: Observations.  
On a whole, irrespective of the econometrics method employed, the results broadly support 
the hypothesis that an increase in the middle class is associated with higher human capital and 
infrastructural accumulation.  
3.2.2 Entrepreneurship and the middle class 
 According to Senauer & Goetz (2003), the emergence of the middle class creates a lot 
of opportunities worldwide for consumer commodities. This tendency stimulates 
diversification to a certain extent. Barnerjee & Duflo (2008) have underlined the nexus 
between innovation and the middle class on the one hand and, entrepreneurship and the 
middle class on the other hand.  
 The emergence of a middle class is positively associated with economic 
diversification. While this nexus is weak under Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) 
estimations, it is not the case with Three-Stage-Least Squares (TSLS). This suggests the need 
for prudence in estimation techniques when assessing the incidence of middle class. This 
correlation is weak (strong) when the TSLS (SUR) method is considered. Moreover, the 
middle class has a negative relationship with weak places in the classification of ease in doing 
business indicators. In other words, an increase would dynamically increase the climate of 
doing business. However, like for economic diversification, results are not consistently 
significant for the two estimation techniques. Hence, prudence is needed.  
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Table 5: Effect of middle class on entrepreneurship   
 MCWtFC MCWFC FC LM UM Obs Method 
Economic 
diversification 
.1880782 
(0.196)    
.4597552 
(0.209)    
.3025981 
(0.215)    
.7709078    
(0.215) 
1.090422  
(0.236)   
41 3SLS 
 .2249155    
(0.008) 
.4868843 
(0.010)     
.3506158 
(0.012)    
.799625    
(0.007) 
.9595511 
(0.032)    
41 SUR 
Doing business -.4808 
(0.323)    
-1.344244 
(0.260)    
-.695163  
(0.399)    
-2.141 
(0.300)    
-3.459995 
(0.233)    
41 3SLS 
 -.494812    
(0.084) 
-1.326246    
(0.031) 
-.6396874    
(0.177) 
-1.93107 
(0.049)    
-3.147468 
(0.026)    
41 SUR 
FC: Floating Class. MCWtFC : Middle class with Floating Class (FC). MCWFC: Middle class without FC. LM: Lower 
middle income. UM: Upper middle income. P-values in brackets.  3SLS: Three-Stage-Least Squares. SUR: Seemingly 
Unrelated Regressions. Obs: Observations.  
3.2.3 Governance, democracy, political stability and the middle class  
 Devarajan et al. (2011) have noted that after control for some variables, governance is 
positively associated with the middle class. Moreover, Loayza et al. (2012) have linked the 
middle class size to improvements in government quality and reforms (with  effect more 
robust than improvement in GDP per capita). The findings of Table 6 support the positions of 
these authors. While the results are a little counter-intuitive in that the effect increases from 
LM to UM, the overall element of consolation is that one should expect governance standards 
in African countries to improve with an evolving middle class.  
Table 6 : Effect of middle class on governance, democracy and political stability  
 MCWtFC MCWFC FC LM UM Obs Method 
Governance  .6286603 
(0.058)    
.2396095 
(0.061)    
.3752104 
(0.082)     
1.030485 
(0.081) 
1.583246    
(0.050) 
41 3SLS 
 .4137896 
(0.011)    
  .186054 
(0.012) 
.2824 
(0.020)    
.5792294    
(0.026) 
1.016148    
(0.006) 
41 SUR 
Political 
Stability  
.0285518 
(0.274)    
.0108704    
(0.290) 
.0172179 
(0.314)    
.0461626    
(0.316) 
.0744507  
(0.227)   
41 3SLS 
 .0155725    
(0.234) 
.0073657 
(0.218)    
.0115702    
(0.233) 
.0155022 
(0.454)    
.0512721    
(0.083) 
41 SUR 
Democracy  -.0198634    
(0.156) 
-.0081187 
(0.138) 
-.0136878 
(0.135) 
-.0342 
(0.172) 
-.0476109 
(0.151) 
41 3SLS 
 -.0097851    
(0.144) 
-.0050829 
(0.096) 
-.0084788 
(0.087) 
-.012834 
(0.226) 
-.0253502 
(0.098) 
41 SUR 
FC: Floating Class. MCWtFC: Middle class with Floating Class (FC). MCWFC: Middle class without FC. LM: Lower 
middle income. UM: Upper middle income. 3SLS: Three-Stage-Least Squares. SUR: Seemingly Unrelated Regressions. Obs: 
Observations.  
 Thurow (1984) had earlier affirmed that a good middle class is necessary in a 
democracy because social agitations have the tendency to increase when people and income 
are polarised. Barro (1999) later substantiated this thesis by asserting that there is higher 
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susceptibility for democratic regimes with evolution towards a middle class. As to what 
concerns Africa, Severino & Ray (2011) have demonstrated a strong expectation for this 
scenario in the continent. While the case of Kenya is consistent with this conjecture (Maupeu, 
2012), an important concern arising is to know whether such a scenario can be generalised.  
 In the short-term, our findings may not adequately and consistently validate the 
significant effect of the middle class on democracy and political stability in Africa. Moreover, 
it is very surprising to notice a negative sign flowing from the middle class to democracy. 
This unexpected findings support the position of Jacquemot (2012, p. 26) in which the 
African middle class may have some political apathy.   
3.2.4 Middle class and Macroeconomics  
 Political choice can also be determined by the social or middle class. According to 
Palma (2011) they affect domestic policies. Sound macroeconomic policies influence the 
constitution of this class, the author does not refute a reverse effect. While societies with a 
middle class consensus would device policies that facilitate economic prosperity, those 
polarised by classes and ethnic groups would opt for redistribution policies.   
 Table 7 below shows the macroeconomic effects of the middle class and ethnic 
diversity, notably, on: budget management, inflation, economic vulnerability and openness. 
While good budget management is associated with an increase in the size of the middle class, 
the nexus is not significant with SUR estimations. We find that inflation is negatively linked 
to the middle class, consistent with Easterly (2001). This linkage has no statistical 
significance. We also notice a positive effect of the middle class on openness, which is 
significant only for MCWFC and FC. The middle class negatively affects economic 
vulnerability, with an increasing magnitude of negativity. Overall, the middle class is not 
uniform across macroeconomic variables.  
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Table 7: Macroeconomic effects of the middle class  
 MCWtFC MCWFC FC LM UM Obs Méthode 
Budget 
management  
 .7049376 
(0.194) 
.2732118 
(0.204)    
.4281133 
(0.236)    
1.138846 
(0.234)    
1.798745 
(0.163)    
41 3SLS 
 .596075 
(0.033) 
.268357 
(0.034) 
.4096161  
(0.048)   
.7809122 
(0.082)    
1.590023 
0.011)        
41 SUR 
Economic 
vulnerability  
-.6074903 
(0.051)    
-.259241    
(0.035) 
-.4304453    
(0.042) 
-1.03723    
(0.050) 
-1.399786 
(0.082)    
41 3SLS 
 -.6560804    
(0.000) 
-.2983751    
(0.000) 
-.4596444    
(0.000) 
-1.0578 
(0.000) 
-1.326682    
(0.001) 
41 SUR 
Openness  2.066416 
(0.108) 
.8179868 
(0.085) 
1.359089 
(0.078) 
3.536422 
(0.113) 
5.042648 
(0.117) 
41 3SLS 
 .6627201 
(0.233) 
.4194226 
(0.097) 
.7703876 
(0.060) 
1.012856 
(0.247) 
1.395236 
(0.274) 
41 SUR 
Inflation  -.073655 
(0.301) 
-.0463717 
(0.401) 
-.0785383 
(0.394) 
-.1908762 
(0.419) 
-.2510282 
(0.462) 
41 3SLS 
 -.0545314 
(0.452) 
-.0405829 
(0.211) 
-.0651459 
(0.216) 
-.1404483 
(0.208) 
-.1540813 
(0.348) 
41 SUR 
FC: Floating Class. MCWtFC : Middle class with Floating Class (FC). MCWFC: Middle class without FC. LM: Lower 
middle income. UM: Upper middle income. 3SLS: Three-Stage-Least Squares. SUR: Seemingly Unrelated Regressions. Obs: 
Observations.  
 
3.2.5 Development, modernisation and the middle class  
 It has been proven that, until the 19
th
 century, the middle class constituted a major 
driving force to economic development in Europe and North America (Adelman & Morris, 
1997; Landes, 1998). This thesis has been confirmed by Yuan et al. (2011) in relation to 
urbanisation/industrialisation in China.  More developed societies have a tendency to move 
from agriculture towards the industry and services (Kongsamut et al., 1997). A hypothesis 
confirmed by Easterly (2001) on the linkage between agriculture and the middle class. In 
other words, the middle class leads to economic sophistication.  
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Table 8: Effects of the middle class on modernisation and development  
 MCWtFC MCWFC FC LM UM Obs Méthode 
Urbanisation   1.637772 
(0.000)    
.67532 
(0.000)    
1.120003 
(0.000)    
2.790327 
(0.001)    
3.891 
(0.001)   
41 3SLS 
 1.338075  
(0.000)   
.6170233 
(0.000)    
.9573743    
(0.000) 
2.03079 
(0.000)     
2.937125  
(0.000)   
41 SUR 
GDP per capita .0494469 
(0.000) 
.1239365    
(0.000) 
.0810715 
(0.000) 
.2106782 
(0.000) 
.2989799 
(0.000) 
41 3SLS 
 .0343191 
(0.000) 
.0743927 
(0.000) 
.0528068 
(0.000) 
.1117256 
(0.000) 
.1652237 
(0.000) 
41 SUR 
Agriculture  6.151248 
(0.906) 
1.205251 
(0.825) 
1.483655 
(0.791) 
7.635407 
(0.885) 
39.77254 
(0.963) 
41 3SLS 
 -1.248646 
(0.000) 
-.599431 
(0.000) 
-.959978 
(0.000) 
-1.883644 
(0.000) 
-2.782417 
(0.000) 
41 SUR 
FC: Floating Class. MCWtFC : Middle class with Floating Class (FC). MCWFC: Middle class without FC. LM: Lower 
middle income. UM: Upper middle income. 3SLS: Three-Stage-Least Squares. SUR: Seemingly Unrelated Regressions. Obs: 
Observations.  
 From Table 8 above, the middle class positively affects urbanisation and GDP per 
capita. These findings are consistently significant across specifications and estimation 
techniques. This is not the case with the effect on the ‘value added by agriculture on GDP’ in 
which with the SUR method, it is negatively affected by the middle class. The sign is 
positively insignificant with 3SLS, which could reflect some lack of robustness. Accordingly, 
the idea of a virtuous cycle between urbanisation and the middle class is not limited to only 
theory: an increasing middle class is translated by growth in the number of consumers. This 
has a positive effect on market size, a boom in the housing market and formalisation of the 
banking system in the economy. High mobility that follows increases economic activity 
which in turn enables cities to attract more ideas, growth of a certain class and profit 
associated with the rising class.  
4. Conclusion  
From our estimations, it could be established that GDP per capita and education affect all the 
middle class dependent variables. However, we have seen a negative nexus for the effect of 
ethnic fragmentation, political stability in general and partially for economic vulnerability. 
Simple positive correlations have been observed for the size of the informal sector, openness 
and democracy.  
We have also attempted to understand the consequences of an emerging middle class in the 
African social dynamic.  We followed Easterly (2001) by using the 3SLS and SUR estimation 
techniques for this purpose. Our findings have shown that the middle class enables the 
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accumulation of human (health, education and social protection) and infrastructural capital. 
While its effect appears to be null on democracy and political stability in the short-term, it 
nonetheless enhances modernisation and better governance. In the absence of robustness, it is 
probable that increasing the middle class can substantially improve economic diversification 
and ease of doing business. At the macroeconomic level, economic vulnerability reduces with 
the growth of the middle class. While the nexus is not robust, its effect on budget 
management is positive. We have also noticed positive relations between the middle class and 
openness, though the nexus is very unstable. Middle class is negatively linked to inflation, 
albeit not significant. 
 The advantages above justify the policy interest of stimulating the middle class. 
Hence, in light of our findings, such policies should target above all, GDP per capita growth 
and education. These policies should also be tailored such that, the most is reaped from ethnic 
fragmentation, especially that which curtails its probability of negative incidence. Moreover, 
policies that directly target the mitigation of economic vulnerability are worthwhile. Lastly, 
the ongoing democratisation process in Africa offers opportunities for the growth of the 
middle class.  
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